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INTRODUCTION
Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, there have
been numerous articles about President Bush’s alleged expansion of
executive authority – be it the warrantless surveillance of US citizens,
detainment of enemy combatants, or signing statements on prisoner
torture.1 However, an opinion issued by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit introduced a fascinating method of
executive authority curtailment. In Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. Chao, the Seventh Circuit expanded the doctrine of
“taxpayer standing” to apply to executive branch actions funded by
general congressional appropriations.2 At first glance, the Seventh
Circuit simply seems to be establishing a check on the executive and
∗ J.D. candidate, December 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology; B.S. Chemical Engineering, May 1999, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I would like to acknowledge Professor Hal Morris,
Julia Lissner, and Mark Diomede for their invaluable help in writing this article.
1
Spencer S. Hsu, Bush Balks at Criteria for FEMA Director; Signing
Statement Asserts Right to Ignore Parts of New Homeland Security Law, The
Washington Post, October 7, 2006 Saturday, Final Edition at A02
2
See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir.
2006), rehearing, en banc, denied by Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao,
447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006).
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granting power to the taxpaying public with this ruling.3 However, a
closer analysis of this case reveals the decision to be a double-edged
sword, since the case also grants power to the federal courts – leading
to potentially unaccountable, undemocratic results. With Freedom
from Religion v. Chao, the gate has been opened for taxpayers to bring
lawsuits challenging virtually any executive action.4 These challenges
can effectively provide “judicial vetoes” of executive actions which
might not easily be remedied by the democratic process. The judicial
branch is now in a position of authority over the acts of the other
branches of government.5 Furthermore, by disregarding Supreme
Court precedent regarding the narrowness of taxpayer standing, the
Seventh Circuit added additional confusion to the maze of taxpayer
standing doctrine.6
This Note is divided into four Sections. Section I of this Note
briefly describes taxpayer standing and its history in the courts.
Section II discusses the Seventh Circuit decision in Freedom from
Religion. Section III analyzes that decision in light of precedent,
reasoning, and public policy. Finally, Section IV concludes that the
decision was incorrectly decided.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN TAXPAYER-STANDING DOCTRINE
Based on Supreme Court interpretation of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, standing is required to invoke the power of a federal
court.7 The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” has three
3

433 F.3d at 996-97.
Id. at 1000 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
5
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-489 (1923)
6
Frank I. Michaelman, Popular Law and the Doubtful Case Rule, 81 Chi.Kent. L. Rev. 1109 (2006) (“[W]hen the political branches of the Government act
against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued,
it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its
precedents with the respect due them under settled principles.”)
7
US CONST. art. III, §2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 (1975).
4
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parts: (1) the plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent "injury in
fact”; (2) there must be some causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of; (3) the plaintiff must demonstrate that a
favorable decision would likely redress that injury.8 Standing also
consists of “prudential” principles, which deny standing to a plaintiff
who has been injured as a result of the defendant's conduct but who is
not the proper person to bring suit.9
The concept of standing as a limitation on judicial jurisdiction has
had a tortured history in the Supreme Court.10 “Standing frequently
has been identified by both justices and commentators as one of the
most confused areas of the law,” 11 although it is generally agreed that
standing is one of the most important doctrines regarding judicial
power.12
A. Supreme Court Precedent Regarding Taxpayer Standing
The taxpayer standing doctrine is “the principle that a taxpayer
has no standing to sue the government for allegedly misspending the
public’s tax money unless the taxpayer can demonstrate a personal
stake and show some direct injury.”13 The taxpayer doctrine was
established since the conduct of the federal government was found to
8

Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737, 742-743 (1995); Ne. Fla. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663664 (1993); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
9
Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 990.
10
See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168 (1992) (noting that from
1965-1994, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing on 109 occasions)
11
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 60
(2d ed. 2002).
12
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 750 (1984) (“The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have "standing" to
invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these
doctrines.”).
13
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
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be too far removed from individual taxpayer returns for any injury to
the taxpayer to be traced to the use of tax revenues.14
The Supreme Court laid out the boundaries on taxpayer standing
in a series of cases which commentators divide into “eras.”15 Professor
Chemerinsky divides these cases into four eras: 1) initial cases
preventing taxpayer standing; 2) the Warren Court’s expansion of
taxpayer standing; 3) the Burger Court’s virtual elimination of
taxpayer standing; and 4) the Rehnquist Court’s decisions.16
In the early 1920s, Frothingham v. Mellon17 established that “the
basic rule is that taxpayers do not have standing to challenge how the
federal government spends tax revenue.”18 In Frothingham, the Court
dismissed a taxpayer suit challenging federal expenditures under the
Maternity Act.19 In that unanimous opinion, Justice Sutherland
emphasized the basic function of limiting judicial review of
congressional acts:
The functions of government under our system are
apportioned. To the legislative department has been
committed the duty of making laws; to the executive
the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary the
duty of interpreting and applying them in cases
properly brought before the courts. The general rule is
that neither department may invade the province of the
other and neither may control, direct or restrain the
action of the other . . . Looking through forms of words
14

Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 990.
See supra note 10, at 168-97 (Professor Sunstein divides American standing
history into five distinct eras.); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 90 (Professor Chemerinksy divides American
standing into four sets).
16
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 90
(2d ed. 2002).
17
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
18
In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1989).
19
262 U.S. 447, 487-88.
15
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to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that
officials of the executive department of the government
are executing and will execute an act of Congress
asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to
prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judicial
controversy, but to assume a position of authority over
the governmental acts of another and co-equal
department, an authority which plainly we do not
possess.20
As such, taxpayer standing to challenge expenditures in general
was denied in Frothingham v. Mellon because the impact of spending
upon the taxpayer was deemed too tenuous, and impeded upon
separation of powers principles.21
Up to 1952, the Supreme Court was consistently applying the
taxpayer standing doctrine, as in Doremus v. Board v. Education22. In
that case, the Court applied the Frothingham taxpayer-standing
doctrine and dismissed the case for lack of standing when plaintiffs
brought suit claiming a violation of the Establishment Clause through
a New Jersey law which allowed public school teachers to read Bible
passage in the classroom.23 The Court held that the injury to the
taxpayer was too remote from the federal treasury and too
indeterminable to be a real injury.24 The Court concluded that Article
III’s requirements were therefore insufficiently satisfied and federal
courts lacked jurisdiction.25

20

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Melon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (U.S. 1923)
(emphasize added).
21
Id. at 489
22
342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952)
23
Id. at 430.
24
Id. at 434.
25
Id. at 434-35.
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A major change occurred in the late 1960s when the Warren
Court created an exception to the concept of taxpayer standing.26 In
Flast v. Cohen, the Court overturned a lower court’s application of
Frothingham when it created an exception stating that “a taxpayer will
have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial
power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and
spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions
which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending
power.”27 In Flast, taxpayers tried to stop the expenditures under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.28 Chief Justice
Warren held that taxpayer standing depends on “whether there is a
logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated.”29 The Court explicitly distinguished Flast (involving an
Establishment Clause violation through Congress’s tax and spending
power) against Frothingham (dealing with Tenth Amendment violation
by Congress not on tax and spending power).30 The Flast Court
justified the exception stating that "the specific evils feared by [its
drafters] that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor
one religion over another or to support religion in general."31
In introducing the Flast exception, the Court developed a two
prong test to determine whether the plaintiffs as taxpayers had
standing to sue: (1) the taxpayer must “allege the unconstitutionality
only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and
spending clause” and (2) the taxpayer must show that the challenged

26

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (“We find no absolute bar in Article
III to suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing
and spending programs.”)
27
Id. at 106.
28
Id. at 85.
29
Id. at 102.
30
Id. at 85.
31
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1865 (U.S. 2006)
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enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations upon the exercise
of the taxing and spending power.32
In 1970s and 80s, under the Burger Court, the narrowness of
the taxpayer standing exception introduced in Flast was revealed. In
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War and United States
v. Richardson, the Court denied standing because the taxpayer
plaintiffs did not challenge a congressional enactment under the
Taxing and Spending Clause, but rather an action of the Executive
Branch.33 Another ruling emphasizing the narrowness of Flast
occurred in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State.34 In that case, the Court dismissed a
taxpayer suit attempting to challenge a federal grant of property to the
Valley Forge Christian College.35 The Court distinguished Valley
Forge from Flast by stating that the allegedly unconstitutional action
in Valley Forge was an executive action, not a congressional statute as
it was in Flast.36 Consequently, “[a]fter Richardson, Schlesinger, and
Valley Forge the only situation in which taxpayer standing appears
permissible is if the plaintiff challenges a government expenditure as
violating the Establishment Clause.”37

32

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1982) (emphasis added).
33
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); D.C. Common Cause v. District
of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The Court has never recognized
federal taxpayer standing outside these narrow facts, and it has refused to
extend Flast to exercises of executive power.”)
34
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
35
Id. at 486-87.
36
The Court in Valley Forge held the taxpayers failed the Flast test in two
respects: (1) the source of their complaint was not a congressional action - Flast
limited taxpayer standing to challenges directed "only [at] exercises of congressional
power” and (2) the property transfer was not an exercise of authority conferred by
the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-80.
37
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 93
(2d ed. 2002).
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Subsequently, under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court
reaffirmed Flast in Bowen v. Kendrick, permitting a taxpayer challenge
to a federal grant program that funded teen pregnancy prevention
through religious organizations38
In 2006, in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Court rejecting
granting standing to taxpayers for allegedly unconstitutional
congressional actions under the Commerce.39 Consequently, if
previous Supreme Court rejections to expanding the narrow Flast
exception were not explicit, DaimlerChrylser reinforced the idea that
the Supreme Court was never comfortable with the Flast exception in
the first place and wanted to keep it narrow.40
B. Other Court Interpretations of Supreme Court Precedent
The narrowness of the Flast and Bowen, when applied to taxpayer
standing, has been noted by sister Court of Appeals and some
commentators. Notably, one commentator stated, "Fate has not been
kind to the Flast decision. In the field of taxpayer standing, it has been
limited to very narrow confines."41
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reconciled Supreme Court precedent involving taxpayer standing by
emphasizing the narrowness of the cases, “Schlesinger, Valley Forge,
and similar cases must be understood as limiting the Flast exception to
the Court's general rule against federal taxpayer standing.”42
In In re Catholic Conference, the Second Circuit had the
opportunity to address an application of Flast to executive action. In re
Catholic Conference involved a pro-abortion group bringing suit
against the U.S. Government because the Internal Revenue Service
38

Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1865 (U.S. 2006).
40
Id.
41
Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 649 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 13 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.1 (2d ed.
1984)).
42
D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
39
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granted tax-exempt status to the Catholic Church.43 The plaintiffs
alleged that the Catholic Church, through its campaigning against
abortion, violated the IRS’s prohibition on lobbying and campaigning
for tax-exempt entities.44 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Second
Circuit distinguished In re Catholic Conference with the Flast and
Bowen opinions by noting that the plaintiff’s complaint centered on an
alleged executive branch action.45 Thus, the Second Circuit made clear
the narrowness of Flast’s exception to Frothingham’s rule against
taxpayer standing.”46
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also emphasized the
narrowness of Flast and Bowen in its ruling denying standing in Rocks
v. City of Philadelphia.47 The court noted that Flast and Bowen serve
as precedential authority only if establishment and free exercise
clauses and congressional taxing and spending power are involved.48
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH IN
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION V. CHAO
A. The Majority Decision in the Three Judge Panel
In Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Chao, the party claiming
taxpayer standing was the Wisconsin-based Freedom from Religion
Foundation, a non-profit tax exempt national association of nontheists
that had been “working since 1978 to promote free thought and defend
43

885 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1022.
45
Id. at 1028.
46
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227-28
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175-176 (1974).
47
Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 649 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Flast and
Bowen are extremely limited holdings. They hold that federal taxpayers have
standing to raise establishment clause claims against exercises of congressional
power under the taxing and spending power of article I, section 8 of the
constitution.”).
48
Id. at 649.
44
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the constitutional principle of the separation of state and church.”49
The target of the Freedom from Religion Foundation’s challenge was
President Bush’s establishment of the White House Office of FaithBased and Community Initiatives by an executive order.50 In holding
for Freedom from Religion Foundation on partial summary judgment,
Judge John C. Shabaz for the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin noted that the government51 had raised concerns
over jurisdictional and prudential mootness and ripeness.52 However,
Judge Shabaz dismissed these concerns stating that the “[d]efendants
must bear the heavy burden to prove that there [was] no reasonable
expectation that the wrong [would] be repeated.”53 Judge Shabaz then
concluded that the defendants failed to meet the burden.”54
On appeal, the government raised issues concerning standing to
the Seventh Circuit. 55 In finding for the plaintiffs, Judge Posner wrote
the majority opinion for the divided panel56, beginning with a
statement of the issue as “whether a taxpayer can ever have standing
under Article III of the Constitution to litigate an alleged violation of
the First Amendment’s establishment clause unless Congress has
earmarked money for the program or activity that is challenged.”57
Judge Posner said that District Judge Shabaz’s opinion would have
49

Freedom from Religion Foundation Homepage, http://ffrf.org, (last visited
Dec. 6, 2006).
50
See Exec. Order No. 13199 (2001); Exec. Order No. 13198 (2001); Exec.
Order No. 13342 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13280 (2002); Exec. Order 13279 (2002).
51
Jim Towey, Patrick Purtill, Brent Orrell, Bobby Polito, Ryan Streeter, John
Porter, Juliete McCarthy, Linda Shovlain, David Caprara, Elaine Chao, Tommy
Thomspon, Rod Paige, John Ashcroft, and Dr. Julie Gerberding
52
Freedom from Religion v. Chao, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39444, 28 (W.D.
Wis. Jan. 11, 2006).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989. For a recent outline
of this case, see 119 HARV. L. REV. 2260.
56
The divided panel included Judge Posner and Judge Wood in the majority,
with Judge Ripple dissenting.
57
Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2006)
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been correct under an “earlier view.”58 He then discussed the cases that
developed taxpayer standing doctrine in United States jurisprudence.59
Judge Posner noted that Justice Frankfurter’s reading of the Article III
flatly rejected taxpayer standing.60 Frankfurter suggested that the
Framers of the Constitution did not envision individual taxpayers
filing lawsuits against the federal government due to the attenuated
relationship between the taxpayers and federal government at the
time.61 Judge Posner noted that standing principles developed by the
Supreme Court was divided into two types: prudential and
constitutional.62 Although Judge Posner was talking about principles
created by Supreme Court precedent, he said that the prudential
principles of standing were “protean and mutable.”63 Judge Posner
explained that the term “prudential” was “the very antithesis of a
definite rule or standard.”64 Moreover, the majority interpreted Flast as
requiring a two prong test for challenges under Article I’s tax and
spending clause including: 1) not an incidental expenditure of tax
funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute and 2)
the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations
imposed on the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending
power that is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by
Article I, §8. 65
Since the previous Flast and Bowen rulings dealt with statutes
involving specified congressional funds, the majority had to noted that
this case involved no specific statutory program involved in this
case.66 Despite that, the court held that “the difference [between a
58

Id.
Similar to Section II of this paper, Judge Posner went into Frothingham,
Doremus, Flast, and Bowen. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 990.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 991.
63
Id. at 992.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 994
59
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specific statutory program and a general program] [could not] be
controlling.”67
Judge Posner set forth some interesting hypotheticals on the when
taxpayer standing would not be necessary but could be used: “Suppose
Homeland Security built a mosque to reduce the likelihood of
terrorism, taxpayer standing would not be essential to challenge the
violation of the Establishment Clause.”68
Because of the present case’s similarity with the facts in Flast,
Judge Posner noted that “the Court in Flast carved an exception for an
incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an
essentially regulatory state.”69 However, Judge Posner then said that
he was going to put to one side the term “regulatory.”70 He then
focused on the term “incidental” and called that term relative.71 He
never returned to the word “regulatory” that was in the controlling
Flast precedent.72
Judge Posner even performed a law and economics analysis with
taxpayer standing and the Establishment Clause:
Imagine a suit complaining that the President was
violating the [Establishment] Clause by including
favorable references to religion in his State of the
Union address. The objection to his action would not be
to any expenditure of funds for a religious purpose; and
though an accountant could doubtless estimate the cost
to the government of the preparations, security
arrangements, etc., involved in a State of the Union
address, that cost would be no greater merely because
the President had mentioned Moses rather than John
Stuart Mill. In other words, the marginal or incremental
67

Id.
Id.
69
Id. at 995.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
68
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cost to the taxpaying public of the alleged violation of
the Establishment clause would be zero.73
In the end, the Seventh Circuit ruled in a three judge panel that
“[t]axpayers have standing to challenge grants by a federal agency to
religious institutions pursuant to statutes that authorize grants to public
and private institutions for services, even though the grants have not
been made by Congress itself.”74
In this expansion of established taxpayer-standing doctrine, the
majority held that it should not matter whether the program was
executive or congressional, or whether a program was funded through
general appropriations rather than earmarked appropriations.75 As
such, the majority expanded taxpayer standing doctrine on two fronts:
permitting taxpayer standing when the program at issue is created by
the executive branch, rather than just those created by the legislative
branch, and permitting taxpayer standing when the program is funded
with general appropriations, rather than just specific congressional
grants.
B. The Ripple Dissent in the Three Judge Panel
In a forceful dissent, Judge Ripple noted that although there might
be an initial appeal towards limiting executive power by using federal
judiciary power, the majority’s approach simply cuts the concept of
taxpayer standing “loose from its moorings.”76 Judge Ripple
explained how the majority opinion was a dramatic expansion of
standing doctrine that did not follow Supreme Court precedent.77 He
explained that the modern doctrine of standing was “hard-born” and
“well-established” and “important” in the Nation’s jurisprudence.78 He
73

Id.
Id. at 997.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 998 (Ripple, J. dissenting).
77
Id. at 997.
78
Id.
74
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scolded the majority stating, “We cannot ignore or treat as malleable
what the Supreme Court has mandated.”79 The disagreement is not
about the Tax and Spending Clause, but rather the constitutional
provision.80 He said that previous rulings apropos standing were “not
simply prudential matters of judicial restraint but constitutional
requirements” and required that the plaintiff show that he personally
suffered actual or threatened injury due to the action of the defendant
and that it would be favorably decided.81 A showing of concrete injury
is an “irreducible constitutional minimum.”82 There must be a nexus
between the taxpayer and the constitutional infringement alleged.83 A
mere disagreement with the government policy is hardly a case or
controversy.84
Judge Ripple said that the majority’s expansive standard made
virtually any executive action subject to taxpayer suit.85 Federal courts
could now intrude on the decision-making prerogatives of the
executive branch.86 The judiciary would effectively be managing the
executive.87 He described the majority’s approach as inching toward
the concept of citizen standing, which has been strictly forbidden by
Supreme Court precedent.88
Finally, Judge Ripple cited sister court cases such as District of
Columbia common Cause v. District of Columbia89 and In re United
States Catholic Conference.90 He said that the Seventh Circuit “ought
79

Id.
Id. at 998.
81
Id. at 997.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1000.
84
Id. at 998.
85
Id. at 1000.
86
Id. at 996.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1000.
89
858 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
90
885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989).
80
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to follow the same course and, in the process, adhere to the principles
set forth in the Supreme Court’s case law.”91
C. The Denial of En Banc Rehearing
After the three judge panel reversed the lower court’s ruling, the
government petitioned the Seventh Circuit for a rehearing en banc.92
In a fascinating ruling, Chief Judge Flaum and Judge Easterbrook, in
separate concurring opinions, agreed with a new dissenting opinion
written by Judge Ripple that the Supreme Court needed to resolve the
controversy.93
Chief Judge Flaum also wrote a concurring opinion denying
rehearing en banc but stated “the position set forth in the dissent is one
which could eventually command high court endorsement.”94 And that
“the needed consideration of this important issue by that tribunal
would be unnecessarily delayed by our further deliberation.”95
Judge Easterbrook hinted at a disagreement with Judge Posner
throughout his opinion. He began his concurring opinion for denial of
rehearing en banc by stating that his vote “[did] not imply that [he]
deem[ed] the panel’s resolution beyond dispute or the issue
unimportant.96 To the contrary, the subject is both recurring and
difficult, and there is considerable force in Judge Ripple’s dissent, and
in the standing analysis of Judge Sykes dissent from Laskowski v.
Spellings, which extends this panel’s holding.”97 Even though both
Judge Flaum and Judge Easterbrook noted the tension between
Supreme Court precedent and Judge Posner’s decision, they still voted

91

Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 1001.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006)
93
Id. at 988-89 (Flaum, C.J., Easterbrook, J. concurring, with Ripple, J.
dissenting).
94
Id. at 988 (Flaum, C.J. concurring).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 989 (Easterbrook, J. concurring).
97
Id.
92
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to deny rehearing en banc, thereby letting Judge Posner’s decision
stand. 98
Judge Easterbrook criticized the Supreme Court decisions as
arbitrary.99 He stated that “comprehensiveness and rationality are not
[the taxpayer standing] doctrine’s hallmarks.”100 Judge Easterbrook
stated that “Nothing we can do would eliminate the tensions between
Flast and Bowen v. Kendrick, on the one hand, and Frothingham and
Valley Forge (plus the many cases such as Defenders of Wildlife) on
the other.”101
In an interesting hypothetical application of the Seventh Circuit
decision, Judge Easterbrook noted how the Supreme Court ruled in a
prominent case that an atheist father had no standing to challenge the
words “under God” in the pledge of allegiance.102 He then suggested
that, according to the Seventh Circuit ruling, the atheist father might
be able to overcome that hurdle.103
In concluding his denial for rehearing en banc, Judge Easterbrook
stated:
The problem is not of our creation and cannot be
resolved locally. There is no logical way to determine
the extent of an arbitrary rule. Only the rule's
proprietors can bring harmony -- whether by extension
or contraction -- or decide to tolerate the existing state
of affairs.104
In the denial of rehearing en banc, both Judge Flaum and Judge
Easterbrook decided not to wade into the matter of taxpayer standing
and noted that the Seventh Circuit was not the right forum to discuss
98

Id. at 988.
Id. at 989.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 990 (Easterbrook, J. concurring).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. (citations omitted).
99
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this matter.105 Instead Judge Flaum simply called both Judge Ripple
and Judge Posner’s opinions “scholarly” and said that the Seventh
Circuit was not able to resolve this issue.106
D. The Dissent in the Denial for En banc Rehearing
The denial of rehearing en banc drew another vigorous dissenting
opinion from Judge Ripple, which was joined by Judges Manion,
Kanne, and Sykes.107 The dissenting opinion by Judge Ripple again
stated that the majority’s holding drastically expands the Supreme
Court 1988 ruling in Bowen v. Kendrick, permitting “virtually any
executive action to be subject to taxpayer suit.”108 The dissent
compared Bowen, which granted taxpayers standing to challenge a
specific congressional appropriation to pay a religious institution to
help adolescent sexual problems with the present case, which involves
an executive order which uses general appropriations.109 Highlighting
the circuit split, the dissent cited the Second Circuit case of In re
United States Catholic Conference (which denied pro-choice
supporters standing to challenge the Catholic Church’s tax-free status)
as an example of the appropriate method of applying the two part test
developed in Flast v. Cohen. 110
Instead of accepting the rationale of Judge Easterbrook, Judge
Ripple stated his belief that:
[T]his case also reflects a view about the nature of
Article III judicial power, the case has serious
implications for judicial governance, and we, as
officers of that branch, have a special duty to ensure
that a decision expanding the authority that we claim
105

Id.
Id. at 998 (Easterbrook, J. concurring).
107
Id. at 990.
108
Id. at 990 (Ripple, J. dissenting).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 991.
106
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for ourselves represents the considered judgment of
every judge on this court. Such a review is especially
appropriate when the Government specifically charges,
as it has here, that the court has "greatly exceeded its
authority by ignoring the Supreme Court's own rules . .
. and substituting its own views of what the law
rationally ought to be.111
Judge Ripple also stated that the Seventh Circuit "decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with the relevant
decisions" of the Supreme Court and has "entered a decision in
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on
the same important matter."112 Judge Ripple cited the requirements for
certiorari and applied those requirements to the case; he concluded that
the Supreme Court should accept certiorari.113
At the conclusion of his dissent, Judge Ripple reached a similar
conclusion as Judge Flaum and Judge Easterbrook - that the Supreme
Court needed to resolve the tensions created by this case.114 He ended
his opinion by stating “the Government therefore has one last forum in
which to seek a return to traditional principles governing the right of a
taxpayer to challenge a decision of the executive.”115
III. ANALYSIS
A. Following Precedent
Examining the three judge panel and the denial of rehearing en
banc, there were five opinions written by four judges from the Seventh

111

Id. at 990.
Id. at 991.
113
Id. at 991.
114
Id.
115
Id.
112
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Circuit.116 Only the majority opinions which expanded taxpayer
standing bemoaned the “tension which has evolved in this area of
jurisprudence.”117 Although dissenting Judge Ripple also requested
that the Supreme Court resolve the issues raised by the case, his
opinion demonstrated how a narrow and faithful application of
Supreme Court precedent would avoid the necessity of such another
sweeping assessment of taxpayer standing doctrine by the Supreme
Court.118 The Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the District
of Columbia similarly did not mention any difficulties in applying
Supreme Court precedent to comparable cases.119 One reason that
Judge Ripple found no need to mention the arbitrariness and tension
was because his opinion was properly following Supreme Court
precedent.120
In this case, the Freedom from Religion Foundation has not
suffered any concrete and particularized injury, but rather is seeking
"to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized
grievances about the conduct of government.”121 Both Frothingham
and Flast, supra, reject that basis for standing as incompatible with
Article III.122
Regardless of the wisdom of permitting taxpayer standing or
not in various situations, the Seventh Circuit is bound to follow the
116

Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006),
contained Judge Flaum, Judge Easterbrook, and Judge Flaum’s opinions; Freedom
from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006), contained Judge
Posner and Judge Ripple’s opinions.
117

Freedom from Religion Found., 447 F.3d 988.
Id.
119
See generally D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4
(D.C. Cir. 1988) and In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028
(2d Cir. 1989).
120
See Freedom from Religion Found., 447 F.3d at 997-1001 (Ripple, J.
dissenting).
121
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
122
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974).
118
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Supreme Court precedent. Flast was established as a narrow exception
to the doctrine barring taxpayer standing.123 Exceptions should be
construed narrowly. Now the exception is threatening to swallow the
entire doctrine of taxpayer standing in the method that Judge Posner
applied.124
B. Contrary to guiding principles
The standing doctrine serves four values: 1) enforcing separation
of powers principles by restricting the availability of judicial review;
2) serves judicial efficiency by preventing a flood of lawsuits; 3)
improves judicial decision by ensuring there is a specific controversy
and an advocate with sufficient personal concern to effectively litigate
a matter; and 4) ensuring judicial fairness in that people raise only
their own rights and concerns.125 The Seventh Circuit’s expansion of
the taxpayer standing doctrine in Freedom from Religion v. Chao
forces an examination of the purposes of having standing doctrine in
the first place.126
First, the standing doctrine serves as an essential element to
the separations of power doctrine.127 The Seventh Circuit’s expansion
of taxpayer standing doctrine has shifted the allocation of power
between the branches of government. The court is effectively inching
towards a judicial veto on executive programs, enabling the courts, "to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department," and to become "'virtually continuing
123

Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (“Although we have
considered the problem of standing and Article III limitations on federal jurisdiction
many times since [Flast], we have consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow
exception it created to the general rule against taxpayer standing”).
124
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 997 (Ripple, J.
dissenting).
125
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
60-62 (2d ed. 2002).
126
Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d 997.
127
See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983).
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monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”128 When
a court interferes with a legislative act or the action of an elected
executive, it thwarts the will or representatives of the actual people.129
Or as Professor Sunstein points out, judges are removed from political
accountability and selected from a highly educated elite.130 Once a
“constitutionalized” decision is issued by a federal court, as occurred
in the disastrous Dredd Scott decision, very few democratic remedies
remain.131
Justice Powell also saw the expansion of standing as a
threat to the proper functioning of the system of checks and
balances, as well as to democratic principles of government:
Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related
to the expansion of judicial power. It seems to me
inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or
citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation
of power at the national level, with a shift away from a
democratic form of government.132
Second, the standing doctrine serves an important function in
improving judicial efficiency by restricting a flood of lawsuits.133 The
Seventh Circuit decision expanded the doctrine of taxpayer standing to
include executive actions and general appropriations, thereby
expanding the avenues in which plaintiffs can bring suit.134 Plaintiffs

128

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (citations omitted).
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (2d ed. 1986)
(describing “The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty” in judicial review of actions taken
by other branches of government).
130
See supra note 10, at 216.
131
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
132
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974).
133
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
60-62 (2d ed. 2002).
134
Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, F. 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).
129
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now need only frame their complaints in methods that comport with a
violation of the Establishment Clause.135
Third, the taxpayer standing doctrine serves to improve judicial
decisions so that the judiciary only decides specific cases with
particularized remedies.136 In this case, the Seventh Circuit is
permitting plaintiffs with no concrete or particularized injury to bring
suit against the executive branch.137 The harm alleged by Freedom
from Religion Foundation is the executive branch’s general use of tax
revenue.138 As a result, due to the unparticularized and unspecific
claim of the plaintiffs, the only remedy possible by the judicial branch
would be, in essence, a judicial veto.
Fourth, the taxpayer standing doctrine serves to ensuring fairness
so that taxpayers only bring lawsuits for which there is a demonstrable
personal and cognizable injury or imminent injury. With the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Freedom from Religion Foundation, the purpose
served by the doctrine is under fire.139 By expanding the doctrine to
encompass executive actions, taxpayers can bring lawsuits against the
executive branch based on the potential harm done to others simply
because they pay taxes. Such a fluid basis for standing has the
possibility of becoming a method “to air his generalized grievances
about the conduct of government.”140 The list of potential damages to
hypothetical people is large. The court has further opened the door by
not limiting lawsuits to those who have a nexus with the injury
alleged.

135

Id.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
60-62 (2d ed. 2002).
137
Freedom from Religion Found., F. 433 F.3d at 1000 (Ripple, J. dissenting).
138
Id. at 994 (majority opinion).
139
Id. at 989-1000.
140
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
136
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C. Judicial Responsibility
Since Marbury v. Madison, the Judiciary’s responsibility has been
to interpret the Constitution and draw limitations on power for the
branches of government, including the judicial branch itself.141 Yet in
their concurring opinions denying rehearing en banc, both Judges
Flaum and Easterbrook refused let the entire court review the issues
concerning judicial self-government created by Freedom from
Religion Foundation v. Chao.142 The denial of rehearing made Judge
Posner’s opinion the law of the land, unless the Supreme Court accepts
certiorari. It is an abdication of its duty for an appellate court to close
its doors143 to resolve tensions that other circuits have answered
faithfully without changing Supreme Court precedent.144 In fact, Chief
Judge Flaum suggested that “the position set forth in the dissent is one
which could eventually command high court endorsement.”145
CONCLUSION
Taxpayer standing has been prohibited by a line of Supreme Court
cases with one narrow exception – if it involves a specific
congressional expenditure of funds that violates the Establishment
Clause. In Freedom from Religion Foundation Inc. v. Chao, the
Seventh Circuit improperly expanded Supreme Court precedent by
permitting taxpayer standing in situations involving executive actions
and use of general congressional funds. At first glance, the Seventh
Circuit seems to be granting power to the taxpaying public to be a
check on the executive branch. However, closer analysis of this case
141

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988-89 (7th 2006).
143
Flast, 392 U.S. at 111.
144
See generally D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4
(D.C. Cir. 1988); In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d
Cir. 1989).
145
See generally D.C. Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 4; Catholic Conference,
885 F.2d at 1028.
142
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reveals the decision to be a power grab by the Seventh Circuit with
potentially unaccountable, undemocratic results. As a result, the
executive and legislative branches of the government may now be
subordinate to the judicial branch rather than co-equal. By not
following Supreme Court precedent narrowly and faithfully, like sister
courts have done, the Seventh Circuit has also added a cloud of
confusion over the complex doctrine of taxpayer standing.
Furthermore, the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that the
controversy warranted Supreme Court intervention, yet the denial of
rehearing en banc made the divided three judge panel’s precedentchanging opinion the law of the land unless the Supreme Court accepts
certiorari.
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